Törvények a tudományos gyakorlatban. Egy ontológiai minimalista humeiánus megközelítés by Koczka, Szilárd
Eötvös Loránd University Faculty of Humanities
Theses of the PhD dissertation
Szilárd Kozcka
Laws in scientific practice
An ontological minimalist Humean approach
Doctoral School of Philosophy
Head of the Doctoral School: Dr. Gábor Boros, DSc, Professor
Analytic Philosophy Doctoral Programme,
Head of the Doctoral Programme: Dr. Zsófia Zvolenszky, PhD, Associate
professor
Members of the Committee:
Chairman of the Board: Dr. László E. Szabó, Dsc, Professor
Official opponents: Dr. Gergely Ambrus, PhD, Associate professor
Dr. Márton Gömöri, PhD
Secretary of the Board: János Tőzsér, PhD, Senior research fellow
Member of the Board: Dr. Zsófia Zvolenszky PhD, Associate professor
Subsidiary members of the Board: Dr. Katalin Farkas DSc, Professor
Dr. Péter Szegedi PhD, Associate professor
Supervisor:
Dr. Gábor Forrai, Dsc, Professor
Budapest, 2017
Contents
1 The aim and scope of the research 3
2 The structure of the dissertation 4
2.1 The Humean approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 The governing conception of laws of nature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Ontological minimalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3 Results 7
2
1 The aim and scope of the research
The dissertation focuses on the problem of laws of nature as presented in the
analytic metaphysics literature. The theories examined are the Humean systems
approach developed and defended by David Lewis (1986, 1994), David Armstrong’s
universals approach (see Armstrong, 1983) and the dispositionalist view of laws held
by Alexander Bird (2005).
Typically, metaphysical (reductionist) approaches attempt to answer the ques-
tion "What are the laws of nature?" solely by means of conceptual analysis. This
type of reasoning relies heavily on intuitive judgements and has lately been criticized
on empirical (Weinberg et al., 2008) as well as on methodological (Williamson, 2004;
Cappelen, 2013) grounds. Results of systematic experiments on intuitions about
central philosophical issues/concepts show that intuitions vary according to factors
such as the subjects cultural and educational background or their socio-economic
status. In the light of these results it is hard to imagine a convincing argument for
the reliability of the philosophical intuitions as evidence in metaphysical debates.
Moreover, there is no explicit agreement or implicit consensus among philosophers
about how to define the term "intuition", the nature of intuitions and their eviden-
tial status are sources of further debates and it is not clear whether proponents of
contradicting metaphysical views would ever agree on which cases can be seen as
paradigmatic examples. One can also find metaphysical approaches unsatisfactory
due to their superfluous ontology alien to scientific practice (e.g. Lange, 2000; La-
dyman et al., 2007). The main concern here is that the ontological framework of a
certain metaphysical system may be redundant in explaining the role of a concept
(i.e. the concept of laws of nature) in scientific practice.
The central question of my thesis is as follows: Is it possible to hold a meta-
physical theory of laws of nature which is immune to objections above? The scope
of the dissertation is to define the restrictions in terms of ontological commitments
about the laws and the so called "lawmakers". There is a consensus among the
proponents of different metaphysical views about the set of criteria that should be
met in order to attain a theory which can sufficiently explain the laws. I argue in
the conclusion that some of these criteria have no foundation in scientific practice
and can be waived. As an alternative to the current metaphysical theories I propose
to accept a modified version of the ontologically least committing Humean approach
but I don’t exclude the possibility that further inquiries will show that the proposed
metaphysically "stripped down" account fails to capture characteristic features of
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laws of nature. This however will not affect the general project that aims to reduce
the number of redundant assumptions in metaphysical debates about the laws and
their role in scientific practice.
2 The structure of the dissertation
The dissertation consists of an introduction and three chapters. In the first two
chapters I examine the challenges that proponents of the Humean view face in light
of the problem of incompatibility of its ontological framework with certain scientific
theories and philosophical arguments in favour of alternative views. In the third
chapter I argue that (1) the concept of laws of nature – as defined by our current
metaphysical theories – is not coextensive with the concept of scientific laws, and
that (2) if we abandon the general metaphysical project (namely, that laws should
be explained within the framework of some general metaphysical theory), we can
develop an ontologically sober account of laws which is more compatible with the
actual scientific practice.
2.1 The Humean approach
In the first chapter, the central doctrine of the Humean approach, Humean su-
pervenience is reviewed. Laws, according to Humean Supervenience are mere regu-
larities, patterns that supervene on the mosaic of local, particular facts. Proponents
of the doctrine can hold different views about the nature of the subvenient base
facts so in order to clarify the subject matter, in section 1.1. the general definition
of Humean supervenience is given. This definition will serve as a guide for evaluat-
ing different versions of Humean supervenience. David Lewis’ original formulation of
the Humean supervenience is reviewed in section 1.2. Ontological oddities of Lewis’s
intrinsic subvenient facts (1.2.1) as well as the incompatibility of Humean superve-
nience with the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (1.2.2) is analysed.
In 1.2.2 an argument is presented that Lewis’s version of Humean Supervenience is
incompatible with the ontology of classical mechanics as well. The question of onto-
logical fundamentalism is raised in 1.2.3. the chapter concludes that an alternative
formulation of Humean supervenience that is not prone to unnecessary commitments
about the Humean base is possible.
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2.2 The governing conception of laws of nature
Opponents of the Humean view have one central assumption in common: they all
claim that laws govern particular facts (i.e. laws are more than mere regularities).
The two main approaches based on the governing conceptionion of laws is discussed
in the second chapter.
One of the popular competitors to the Humean approach is the view that ap-
peals to universals to distinguish the laws from the accidental true generalizations.
According to this approach (elaborated and defended by Armstrong (1983), Dretske
Dretske (1977) and Tooley Tooley (1977) in the late 70’s) the difference between the
law that “All uranium spheres are less than a mile in diameter” and the coincidence
that “All golden spheres are less than a mile in diameter” is that the first sentence
expresses a necessitation relation between universals while the generalization about
the golden spheres does not. The necessitation relation – according to this view –
is a second order universal ( namely: a relation between the first order universals).
This approach, often referred to as the ADT theory is evaluated in section 2.1.
An alternative non-Humean view is the dispositionalist account of the laws of
nature. According to this view a sentence like “All uranium spheres are less than a
diameter” expresses the dispositional property of uranium that when it reaches the
critical mass a nuclear chain reaction will take place. Dispositional properties are
necessary in a following sense: if a particular possesses a dispositional property, then
there is no possible world where this particular lacks the same property. This ensures
the necessity of the laws and explains the difference between laws and accidental
generalizations. (see e.g. Alexander Bird Bird (2005)) The dispositionalist view is
discussed in section 2.2.
In section 2.3. the classical arguments against the regularity theory are studied.
Regularity theory is part of the Humean view and it can be summarized as follows:
Laws are mere regularities, there is no necessary connection present that we can
refer to in explaining the difference between laws and mere regularities. Arguments
against this formulation of regularity theory (reconstructed in 2.3.1) can be refuted
by introducing the Ramsey-Lewis account. In section 2.3.2 Lewis’s proposal to define
laws of nature as the axioms / theorems of the deductive system that achieves the
best balance between informativeness and simplicity is presented.
The necessitation relation in the ADT theory or the metaphysical necessity of
laws are commitments that can only be justified if the ontologically more sober
Humean view is not sufficient to explain the role of laws in scientific practice. An
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argument in favour of the governing conception of laws thus required. The govern-
ing conception of laws often supported with arguments backed by common sense
intuitions about the governing feature of laws. The main focus in section 2.4 is to
evaluate these thought experiments. The conclusion is that the thought experiments
in question will not convince a proponent of the Humean view. They are free to
reject the assumption that concept of laws (e.g. that the laws govern) presupposed
by these thought experiments.
2.3 Ontological minimalism
Althought the Humean view can be defended against the objections mentioned in
Chapter 2, Humean supervenience in its original form still seems to be incompatible
with the ontology suggested by certain scientific theories. The weakened version of
the doctrine (proposed in 1.2.3) which does not refer to intrinsic, local, fundamental
properties can be seen as a general thesis about the relation between the nomic
and non-nomic states of affairs: No specification of the Humean base-fact can be
provided based on this proposal. In the third chapter a general argument against
the metaphysically motivated reductionist accounts is given. In section 3.1. an
argument is presented against the metaphysical accounts of laws of nature. In the
third chapter the main focus is on the role of laws in scientific practice instead of a
general metaphysical picture.
In section 3.1.1. I argue that scientific laws are not coextensive with the laws of
nature as defined in the metaphysical literature. For an account that explains the
role that laws play in scientific practice, a revision of our common sense concept is
needed. With this revision a minimalist approach can be developed. The subject
of the inquiry in section 3.1.2 is the reliability of philosophical intuitions. In the
light of recent studies intuitions in general do not count as reliable evidence in
favour of a metaphysical claim. In section 3.2.1 I examine the criteria of adequacy
for metaphysical accounts of laws and argue that some of them can be weakened.
Although the metaphysical theories in question differ in many important aspects,
they all agree that the following set of criteria must be met in order to attain a
theory that is sufficiently explains the laws:
1. Laws are universally true statements
2. Laws are not accidental generalizations
3. Laws enable predictions about future observations
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4. Laws support counterfactual claims
5. Laws are mind- and theory-independent
The goal of this and the 3.2.2 section is to show that an adequate account of the
role laws play in scientific practice is possible without the commitment to all of the
above criteria. A list of weakened criteria is also proposed. The minimalist criteria
are:
1* Laws can be expressed by a universally quantified implication ∀x(Fx ⊂ Gx)
2* Laws are epistemically necessary
3* Laws enable predictions about future observations
4* A law is stable under counterfactual suppositions consistent with the set of
laws
5* The correlations expressed in laws are part of the objective reality
3 Results
Thesis 1. The concept of laws of nature – as defined by our current metaphysical
theories – is not suitable for explaining the role of laws in scientific practice.
Thesis 2. By weakening the adequacy criteria implicitly invoked in metaphysical
theories an ontological minimalist account can be developed.
Thesis 3. The Ontological minimalist approach is sufficient to explain the role of
laws in scientific practice.
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